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ABSTRACT
The protection of assets, including IT resources, intellectual prop-
erty and business processes, against security attacks has become
a challenging task for organizations. From an economic perspec-
tive, rms need to minimize the probability of a successful security
incident or attack while staying within the boundaries of their in-
formation security budget in order to optimize their investment
strategy. In this paper, an optimization model to support infor-
mation security investment decision-making in organizations is
proposed considering the two conicting objectives (simultane-
ously minimizing the costs of countermeasures while maximizing
the security level). Decision models that support the rms’ deci-
sions considering the trade-o between the security level and the
investment allocation are benecial for organizations to facilitate
and justify security investment choices.
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1 INTRODUCTION
More and more organizations are highly reliant on information
technology (IT) for their operative business to the extent that fail-
ure of IT systems could seriously damage the rm [34]. Additionally,
security threats have become more advanced and frequent in the
past years [39]. According to a global survey of Grant Thornton,
one in six businesses has been targeted by a cyber-attack in the
past year [24]. This led to a blow up of the costs caused by se-
curity incidents: In 2015, cybercrime is estimated to have caused
$315 billion in damages worldwide [24]. To avoid these damages,
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organizations need to protect systems, data and processes by reduc-
ing vulnerabilities and by improving their monitoring capabilities
[18]. Specically, they invest into various security technologies
to prevent, or, at least, reduce the probability and the impact of
breaches. These security countermeasures protect systems, data
and processes against technical failure, damage or attacks such
as data loss prevention, spy-ware detection, removal applications
and cryptographic techniques [18, 20]. Information security invest-
ments surpassed $75.4 billion worldwide in 2016 and are expected
to grow further [13, 19].
When it comes to information security investments, key tasks for
organizations are (1) to determine the optimal amount to invest, (2)
to decide which technical, managerial and organizational security
countermeasures lead to a sucient level of protection and (3) to
decide how much should be spent on which countermeasure in the
presence of budget constraints [2, 12, 23]. All in all, deciding on
investments considering the trade-o between investment costs
and the increase in information security that is brought by the
investment is a challenging task for information security managers:
a variety of security controls is available and recommended but
optimal decisions need to be made in the presence of trade-os
between the two conicting objectives. In practice, these decisions
are frequently made based on the personal perception and experi-
ence of the decision maker who is usually unfamiliar with certain
system characteristics, vulnerabilities and threats [51]. Academic
researchers approached this problem with quantitative and qualita-
tive methods neglecting the crucial factor of practical applicability
[51]. To address this issue, we pose the following research question:
How do rms need to allocate their information security
budget in order to maximize the security level (i.e. to mini-
mize the risk of a successful attack) while minimizing their
information security expenses?
To answer this research question, we provide a multi-objective
optimization model that can be used as a decision support system by
organizations to determine the security controls to invest in for an
optimal result regarding the maximization of security and minimiza-
tion of investments, in order to optimize their investment strategy.
Multi-objective optimization is a decision-theoretic approach to
nd solutions for multiple objective problems, i.e. optimization
problems involving more than one objective function which have
to be optimized simultaneously.
This paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we give
a short overview on the literature on decision-making in the con-
text of information security investments. Afterwards, we present
the multi-objective optimization model and discuss approaches to
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nding solutions. Finally, we conclude the paper and give possible
directions for future research.
2 RELATEDWORK
According to Huang et al. [29], academic research streams in the
eld of information security investments address the following
three main questions: (1) what is the optimal amount of informa-
tion security investment, (2) in what security controls to invest,
and (3) how to make the investment eective. The rst question
is mainly approached with traditional decision analysis including
utility theory or value-at-risk approaches [29], e.g., in [21], [1] or
[30]. The third question regarding the eectiveness of the infor-
mation security investment has been addressed in literature with
game theory [29], e.g., in [10, 16, 17] or [41]. The rst and third
question will not be addressed in this paper.
We focus on the second question regarding the allocation of the
prior determined budget to security controls. In academic litera-
ture, this allocation problem has been addressed with traditional
management tools like cost-benet analysis or nancial analysis
[29] but is still not suciently solved [44]. Cost-benet analysis
methods have been applied to compare alternative security designs
with the rms current implementation of security countermeasures
to check if a more ecient selection is available [8].
In nancial analysis approaches metrics such as return on se-
curity investment (ROSI), net present value (NPV) or internal rate
of return (IRR) are used as decision-support to select appropri-
ate investments [22, 25, 32, 33, 40, 47, 49]. Furthermore, analytic
hierarchical process (AHP) has been applied to determine the opti-
mal allocation of the information security budget [6]. In the AHP
model qualitative concerns and quantitative (nancial) measures
in information security are combined [6].
In addition, optimization models have been used for the alloca-
tion of countermeasures: In [52] a multi-objective decision-making
framework is used to meet the conict between cost and benet.
The opportunity costs and the direct costs including procurement,
training and implementation of security controls are minimized
with regard to several economic constraints.
The multi-objective approach presented in [46] takes the decision-
maker’s risk-preferences into account and supports him in select-
ing portfolios of security controls in order to reduce the risk of
security incidents. Three objective functions (minimizing the costs,
minimizing residual risk and maximizing the number of measures
in a portfolio) are considered [46]. Sawik [43] also considers the
decision-makers cost/risk preferences and his preferred condence
level. Furthermore, Viduto et al. [51] provide a model to select se-
curity countermeasures regarding nancial costs and residual risks.
While considering the relationship between system vulnerabilities,
threats and countermeasures, a risk assessment and optimization
model (RAOM) was proposed [51].
While extant research has contributed useful insights in the
domain of information security investment allocation, a decision-
support model for investment allocation considering the classic
components of risk analysis namely assets, controls, vulnerabilities
and threats and their interdependencies is still missing [27]. In order
to close this gap, we propose a multi-objective optimization model
to support information security investment decision making which
will be described in the following.
3 MULTI-OBJECTIVE
OPTIMIZATION-MODEL
In this paper the terms asset, threat, vulnerability and control are
dened as follows:
An asset ai , i = 1, ...,n is a tangible or intangible resource in-
cluding people, property and information which has value for the
rm and needs protection [5], for example hardware, software, data,
network infrastructure, company reputation, knowledge or skills.
A threat tj , j = 1, ...,m is dened as any circumstance, entity or
event that can exploit a vulnerability, intentionally or accidentally,
and access, damage, or destroy an asset [4, 36]. Threats include
natural disaster (e.g., lightning, hurricane) and internal or external
cyber threats (malicious former or current employees, competitors,
terrorists or hackers) [7].
A vulnerability vk , k = 1, ...,p is a technical or organizational
weakness or gap in a rm’s protection eorts which can be exploited
by threats and result in security incidents [5]. Examples are software
and hardware bugs or backdoors, insucient policies for employees
or ineective controls.
Controls cl , l = 1, ...,q are countermeasures which reduce the
ability for a threat to exploit existing vulnerabilities by preventing,
detecting, counteracting or mitigating security risks [5]. These con-
trols can be classied into three categories [45]: technical controls
including rewalls, antivirus software and encryption techniques,
operational controls including physical access controls and backup
capabilities and management controls including policies and em-
ployee training [3, 45].
Methods and procedures for the identication of assets, threats,
vulnerabilities and controls in organizations can be found in [32],
[15], [9] or [35]. To identify a rm’s assets, a framework provided
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) can be
applied which uniquely identies assets using known information
[54]. For the identication of threats, archival records of attacks in
log les or threat modelling techniques (e.g., attack graphs, attack
trees or onion skin models) can be used [37]. Vulnerabilities can
be identied through automated vulnerability scanning tools or
penetration tests with the aid of databases such as the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) which publicly provides information
on reported vulnerabilities [51, 55]. Moreover, a comprehensive list
of 114 security controls in 14 groups can be found in the informa-
tion security standard ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [31]. From this list, the
organization can identify those security controls which are already
applied.
Once this information has been gathered, the decision maker
is facing the problem of choosing the most eective and ecient
security controls to implement.
The relationship between the constructs is depicted in Figure 1
adopted from [50]: controls protect the assets from harm through
threats. Thus implementing a control aims to close, or at least re-
duce, a vulnerability. To be more precise, assets are aected by
vulnerabilities and threads exploit these vulnerabilities, if they are
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Figure 1: Interrelationship between assets, threats, vulnera-
bilities and controls [50]
not protected by a corresponding control. For example, the asset
data can be aected by the vulnerability lack of training and the
threat employee can exploit this vulnerability. The associated con-
trol is a security workshop to train employees.
Therefore, we assume the relations
R :=
{(ai ,vk ), (tj ,vk ), (cl ,vk ) | i = 1, ...,n; j = 1, ...,m;
k = 1, ...,p; l = 1, ...,q
}
.
In the following, (ai ,vk ) ∈ R indicates that the asset ai is aected
by the vulnerability vk . Analogously, (tj ,vk ) ∈ R indicates that the
threat tj exploits the vulnerability vk . In consequence, the set of
all threats exploiting the vulnerability vk can be expressed as
{tj | j = 1, ...,m and (tj ,vk ) ∈ R}. (1)
Furthermore, let wai be the importance value of the asset ai as
described in [15]. This importance value indicates the comprehen-
sive impact on the rm if the asset should not be available and can
be calculated from the importance values of the business processes
which require this asset [15]. Additionally, P(tj ) be the probability
of the threat tj occurring. It can be calculated as described in the
threat probability determination phase in [15]. The quality of a
control cl is dened as дcl as described in [15]. The quality дcl
of a control cl indicates the probability of a control protecting a
vulnerability. Additionally, svk is the severity of the vulnerability
vk which indicates the overall impact on the organization should
the vulnerability be exploited by a threat.
For the multi-objective optimization model two objective func-
tions are considered with the primary objective being the maxi-
mization of the security level and the secondary objective being
the minimization of the investment amount in information security
controls and costs in case of security incidents. These two objec-
tive functions are optimized with respect to the implementation of
controls (decision variables) in the presence of constraints on the
variables, i.e. a solution is computed which gives the values of the
objective functions acceptable for the decision maker.
Note that the threats are modelled as uncontrollable variables,
i.e. they are not under the control of the decision makers.
Due to the duality principle, i.e. converting a maximization to a
minimization problem by multiplying the objective function by −1,
the multi-objective optimization model has the general form
min (f1(x), f2(x))
s.t. x ∈ X
with x being a vector of decision variables and X being a feasible
set for x dened by constraint functions.
In the following, we will develop the two objective functions (se-
curity function and cost function) and the constraints. Afterwards
we discuss approaches to solving the multi-objective optimization
model.
3.1 Security Function
To calculate the security level, we assume that the total security
level is computed from the security levels per asset weighted by
the assets’ importance value wai , i.e.
security level =
∑
ai
security level (ai ) ·wai . (2)
Hereby, the security level of an asset ai is calculated by
security level (ai ) = 1 −min
(
1,
∑
vk(ai ,vk )∈R
s(vk )
)
(3)
which means that the security level of ai is diminished by the
severities of each vulnerability ai is aected by. To ensure a consis-
tent interpretation of the security level of ai , negative values are
prohibited (by applying the minimum function).
The severity svk of a vulnerability vk is computed from the
corresponding threats and controls [53].
The probabilities of occurrence of the treats are regarded as
independent events. Hence, the probability of occurrence for a set
of threads threatening a vulnerability vk is computed as follows:
1−
( ∏
tj
(tj ,vk )∈R
1−P(tj )
)
= P(t1∨t2∨ ...∨tm ) for (tj ,vk ) ∈ R. (4)
The probability that vk is not protected by the corresponding con-
trols (the gap as depicted in Figure 1) is∏
cl(cl ,vk )∈R
(1 − дcl ) (5)
and therefore we set
s(vk ) =
∏
cl(cl ,vk )∈R
(1 − дcl ) ·
(
1 −
∏
tj
(tj ,vk )∈R
(1 − P(tj ))
)
. (6)
All in all, the security function is∑
i
wai ·
(
1 −min
(
1,
∑
vk(ai ,vk )∈R
(
(
∏
cl(cl ,vk )∈R
(1 − дck ))
·
(
1 −
∏
tj
(tj ,vk )∈R
(1 − P(tj ))
))))
. (7)
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In the security function, the set of assets, threats and vulnerabilities
is xed whereas the set of controls is variable.
3.2 Cost Function
According to [26, 48], the cost function consists of
• conguration-specic costs including software costs (with li-
cense fees), hardware costs and one-time IT labor costs for setup,
• operating costs including annual xed operating costs (e.g., an-
nual license fees, updates) and annual variable operating costs
(e.g., employee workshops or training),
• costs in case of security incidents including immediate economic
impact (e.g., disruption of business processes, damage in system
requiring repair), short-term economic impact (e.g., negative
impact on reputation of rm) and long-term economic impact
(e.g., decline in stock price).
We dene a security incident as follows: A threat tj successfully
exploits a vulnerability vk and accesses, damages or destroys an
asset ai resulting in economic losses. The set of all security inci-
dents is denoted by SI. The cost of such a security incident are
reduced by the controls cl which aect the vulnerability vk , i.e.
C(vk ) := {cl | l = 1, ...,q and (cl ,vk ) ∈ R}.
Accordingly,
cost function :=
∑
cl
conguration-specic costs (cl )
+
∑
cl
operating costs (cl )
+
∑
(ai ,tj ,vk )∈ SI
costs in case of security incidents(ai , tj ,vk ,C(vk )).
(8)
Hereby the conguration-specic costs regarding all controls are∑
cl
(
software costs(cl ) + hardware costs(cl ) + IT labor costs(cl )
)
.
(9)
For already implemented controls conguration-specic costs are
negligible or signicantly lower than for newly purchased ones.
The operating costs regarding all controls are∑
cl
T∑
t=0
xed operating costs(cl ) + variable operating costs(cl , t)
(1 + k)t
(10)
with t = 0, ...,T being the time horizon and k the interest rate.
Scaling may be necessary for conguration-specic and operating
costs since one-time or annual license fees for certain controls (e.g.,
anti-virus software) may apply to the whole organization or specic
entities (e.g., each computer requires its own license).
The costs in case of a security incident (ai , tj ,vk ) ∈ SI are com-
puted through
immediate impact (ai , tj ,vk ,C(vk ))
+ short-term impact (ai , tj ,vk ,C(vk ))
+ long-term impact (ai , tj ,vk ,C(vk )). (11)
For the computation of the immediate, short-term and long-term
impacts as functions of ai , tj ,vk and C(vk ), valuation scores for
intangible damages caused by security incidents which range from
1 to 10 as developed in [14] can be used. These valuation scores are
mapped to nancial losses. For instance, a major stock price impact
has the valuation score 10 and the associated nancial loss of $25
M to $30 M for a specic rm [14].
3.3 Constraints
For the multi-objective optimization model we maximize the se-
curity level and minimize the costs subject to the following con-
straints.
3.3.1 Budget Constraint. Since most organizations have a bud-
get for information security which can be spent on security controls
[42], a budget constraint is required. Therefore, we add the inequal-
ity constraint
costs ≤ budget. (12)
This budget should be determined by the decision maker in advance.
It can be obtained from a variety of methods ranging from personal
opinion to formal theoretical development (e.g., [21]).
3.3.2 Non-negativity and Integrality Conditions. The following
conditions on the data parameters should be met:
дcl ∈ [0, 1] ∀ l = 1, ...,q, (13)
P(tj ) ∈ [0, 1] ∀ j = 1, ...,m, (14)
wai ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i = 1, ...,n, (15)
n∑
i=1
wai = 1. (16)
Note that constraints for the severity svk arise from the constraints
on дcl and P(tj ) and that the security level as dened through the
security function (7) has a value between 0 and 1 and thus is nor-
malized and ratio-scaled, improving the interpretability.
In our model, the non-negativity and integrality conditions are
hard constraints, i.e. they are required to be satised. The budget
constraint is a soft constraint which has some variable values that
are penalized in the objective function if the conditions on the
variables are not satised.
4 SOLVING THE MULTI-OBJECTIVE
OPTIMIZATION-MODEL
Since the security level increases with high investments because
those investments are said to reduce vulnerabilities and expected
losses, the two objective functions as dened above are conicting.
Therefore, there does not exist one single solution that simultane-
ously optimizes each objective but a (perhaps innite) set of pareto
optimal solutions1. In practice, however, the decision maker only
needs one solution and has to choose one of the optimal solutions.
He has to include additional information, namely his preferences
among the two competing objectives. In our case, the decision
1A solution is pareto optimal if none of the objectives can be improved without im-
pairing at least one of the others [11].
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maker needs to weight the objectives depending on whether he
considers the minimization of investments or the maximization of
the security level as more important.
For the consideration of the decision maker’s preferences three
dierent approaches are available [38]. These approaches can be dis-
tinguished from each other based on the role played by the decision
maker [46]: (1) When using the a priori approach, the decision maker
species his preferences before the optimization is conducted. (2)
In an a posteriori approach the decision maker chooses one solution
out of a representative set of pareto optimal solutions according to
his preferences after the optimization is conducted. The a posteriori
approach is the most common approach [28]. (3) In an interactive
approach the decision maker provides information on his prefer-
ences at various times during the optimization. This information is
taken into account when generating new pareto optimal solutions
which can be assessed by the decision maker in the next iteration
[38]. Therefore, the interactive approach allows the decision maker
to guide the search for the optimal solution.
The drawback for the a priori approach is that it may be dif-
cult for the decision maker to dene his preferences before the
optimization starts because he may not yet have gathered enough
information on the alternatives and their strengths and weaknesses
[46]. In the a posteriori approach, however, the choosing among
a large number of solutions may be challenging. Both problems
are eliminated in the interactive approach. Moreover, the computa-
tional costs are low for interactive methods [38].
All in all, the interactive approach for nding the optimal solu-
tion to our multi-objective optimization model is recommended.
5 CONCLUSION
We developed a multi-objective optimization model which can
be used in organizations to determine the optimal allocation of
the security expenses to specic security controls. It is taken into
account that rms simultaneously aim to reduce their spending on
information security and to attain a certain level of security. These
goals are modelled as objective functions which are optimized with
respect to the implementation of security controls in the presence
of hard constraints on the variables. To develop the two objective
functions, we consider an interrelationship between the constructs
assets, vulnerabilities, threats and security controls. Finally, we
identify the interactive approach as the most appropriate one for
solving the proposed model.
The model can be utilized in organizations as a decision support
system to determine the security controls to invest in for an optimal
result regarding costs and security. The decision maker is provided
with quantitative results to justify the decision he ultimately makes
against his supervisor.
In the future, we would like to evaluate the presented model with
conducting a case study to test the model’s real world applicability
and to discuss the benets of adopting quantitative decision support
techniques in comparison with qualitative ones.
Furthermore we will extend the model so that risk-preferences
of the rm are taken into account, i.e. whether the organization or
the decision maker has a risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking
attitude to information security.
Also we would like to consider the dierent important values
of assets for dierent departments or stakeholders. For example,
a specic software may be essential to one department’s business
but irrelevant to another’s business.
Moreover, the compatibility of security controls to each other
is crucial: security controls might be mutually exclusive or reduce
each other’s eectiveness when implemented simultaneously. Such
interdependencies need to be modelled as constraints.
Additionally, the model should consider that the implementation
of security controls can cause further hidden costs. For instance,
encryption on mobile computing devices may slow down the boot
process which reduces the employees’ productivity or impedes
business processes.
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